As another round of peace talks gets underway in Kazakhstan, some analysts are declaring that this effort to end Syria’s long war will be different from previous ones. But such optimism is premature, especially as the underlying dynamics of conflict remain unchanged. For one thing, the main belligerents are still deeply committed to their objectives, which far exceed what they appear willing to concede.
A second challenge is that armed actors often have little incentive to enter into peace negotiations if their own military position has been eroded. The regime in Syria, for example, does not want to discuss a power-sharing agreement with rebels that are heavily weakened and demoralized by years of devastating fighting. And the rebels do not hope to negotiate away the territory they have fought for and won.
Finally, negotiations have a much better chance of succeeding when they are conducted by multiple parties. But this can also be problematic, particularly when it leads to unhelpful competition between a number of different regional and international actors, as in Sudan’s ongoing conflict.
Another issue is that social movements involved in nonviolent resistance often have limited understanding of what a peace process can achieve and struggle to engage with it effectively. This is in part because many movement activists consider themselves to be “low-power” and prefer to focus on preserving their bargaining power rather than expanding it. As a result, they can be reluctant to participate in mediation processes and may oppose the inclusion of social movements, even when these are likely to increase the likelihood that negotiated agreements will endure.
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